In this essay, I make sense of two different ideas of truth to discover a theatre that people would need in an age that sees the artform as a sometime want. I first wrestle with Plato’s concept of truth as the idea (eidos) and then Martin Heidegger’s notion of truth as unconcealment (aletheia). I grapple with these two meanings of truth in order to find a foundation for the founding of my theatre company SEERCRAFT, which will be staging its debut production this September. So long as a society needs truth, then anything that is truthful is needed. If there is a potential for a theatre that is needed, then, perhaps it could be discovered as an instance of truth. The success of a theatre company, therefore, depends on what exactly we mean by truth, and the place that art occupies according to this meaning.
I
Let me begin with Plato’s understanding of truth.
In Book III of Plato’s The Republic (398 a), Socrates proposes that all artists are to be excluded from the ideal city. For Plato, artists are what he calls ‘imitators’, who, as imitators, make productions that are a “third from a king and the truth” (597 e). According to this standard, art is not truth. Rather, artworks are counterfeits which are ‘thrice removed’ from truth. Artists produce works that are furthest from the truth, and Socrates takes aim particularly at the theatre artists of his age: the poet or “the maker of tragedy.”
For Plato, the highest truth is not the tangible reality within which we participate. The highest truth comes from the idea (eidos) or form; a sort of abstract template which gives form to tangible things. According to this concept of truth, the idea of a couch is truer than the couch in my living room. This is because what is truly true, for Plato, is singular, unchanging and universal. Physical things, on the other hand, are changeable (not immutable), reproducible (not singular), and could vary across time (not universal). And truth as this uni-versal idea has consequences for the rank and place of art according to this standard. Where a carpenter makes a tangible copy of an idea, the artist makes a copy of this copy; the painter of a couch produces the shadow of a counterfeit. The upshot is that a city which prizes truth as the highest standard places art at the bottom of the ranks and is not welcome in the ideal city at all.
Insofar as theatre is an artform then, theatre is not only distant but stands furthest from the truth. Theatre is unimportant, and even malicious, for a city that prizes truth.
In his book of the same name, John Barish famously calls such arguments the ‘antitheatrical prejudice’. And for Barish, this ‘prejudice’ has set the standard which has denounced theatre throughout the history of philosophy.
But perhaps “prejudice” is too strong a word, although we may concede that Plato’s argument is antitheatrical.
Given the concern for truth in an age of deception and misinformation today, it would seem that Plato’s standard for truth is still somewhat in effect. Moreover, while theatre is not ‘banished’ from the modern city entirely, a Platonic standard is somewhat affirmed by the general opinion that theatre is a sometime piece of entertainment. But not an all-time need for our attendance.
As such, so long as we are in need of truth, no one is in need of the theatre.
For a conception of truth that is so compelling, it stands as a devastating blow for theatre practitioners.
So it goes with the Platonic standard of truth and its modern variation that holds for us today.
II
The modern philosopher Martin Heidegger, however, conceives of both truth and art in different terms. Heidegger also conceives of truth in three stages. But unlike Plato, the work of art is not that which is furthest from the truth. Here is how Heidegger conceives of truth.
The first tier, for Heidegger, is the conventional sense of truth also known as the ‘theory of correspondence’. Truth, on this plank, is understood as correctness. Things are correct when the statement of a thing corresponds or matches with a state of affairs. The statement “my table is brown” is correct only when the table is factually brown. On this level, an objective way of seeing things is required to make such assertions.
But for Heidegger, the objective way of seeing is a way but not the primary way of seeing. Objective correctness derives from a more practical way of seeing and being which he calls ‘circumspection’ (umsicht). One literally looks (sicht) around (um) and over the object and encounters them primarily in a more meaningful light. And the meaning of something is found in terms of how we interact with them. The truth of things on this second level, then, is seen by the role things play in our lives. For the case of the couch, we see it in terms of its serviceability or purpose (um), namely, as something to sit comfortably in. Things usually play an instrumental role in our lives and so are not primarily encountered as objects but as tools. By extension, while people are not reducible to mere tools, we do primarily see them according to their practical roles. Parents could indeed be objectively identifiable, but they only make sense to us as parents because of the role they play in our lives.
But this second tier is made possible by another level of truth. The third stage of truth is the practical context which Heidegger calls a ‘world’. World, in this case, is not seen as the sum total of objects but as a whole network of relations which gives things and people their meanings and predetermines to some extent how we interact with them. A practical context of woodwork and music is that which grants tools, instruments and the profession of the guitar-making luthier their meanings. And when taken out of context, they can be stripped of their meanings in an objective way. Or they could acquire a new meaning when encountered in a different context. A man could be seen as a luthier to his customers in his guitar shop, but to his family he is primarily a son, a husband, a father, and so on.
Altogether, Heidegger conceives of truth in terms of 1) objective (correctness), 2) circumspective (practical), and 3) worldly (contextual) stages.
Levels two and three in Heidegger’s program of truth bear another significance that is different to truth as correctness. On the first level, truth as correctness is an active assertion of reality. This level, however, hides a more receptive condition for the assertion. A table needs to be presenting as brown for the assertion to be deemed correct. On the second plank, things are ‘discovered’ in terms of their use or the role they play in a world. Hammers, couches, stationary, musical instruments, and human roles are ‘discovered’ through our interactions with them. In other words, it is not we who are the inventors of the meaning of things, but that the meaning of things are given to us as things that make sense according to we relate to them. Heidegger famously appeals to the Greek word for truth, a-letheia, which literally mean an un-veiling of things and reality. The practical meaning of things and their contextual worlds are discovered and so are un-veiled to us as things and realms which somehow already makes sense to us. Truth, for Heidegger, is essentially un-concealment, and we stand and exist within that truth.
Where the two thinkers of truth differ, then, is that, for Heidegger, the practical realm is the standard for the truth of being or ‘reality’. Whereas for Plato, the practical context occupies a step beneath the ‘super-sensuous’ idea.
III
Where does art stand, then, in Heidegger’s program of truth? And, insofar as theatre is an artform, where would theatre stand if truth was understood in terms of aletheia, as un-concealment?
The significance of Heidegger’s conception of art lies in the fact that on levels two and three, we are usually oblivious to the items we use and the contextual world. When working with a hammer, my intention of striking the nail into a plank of wood tends to eclipse the hammer itself. I am more concerned with the task of hammering without jamming my fingers, than the utensils which are employed to achieve it. Moreover, as I engage in the task, I become oblivious the construction world I’m in. We seem to know this when we reflect on the experience of being ‘absorbed’ in task, or ‘in the zone’ of doing something. As such, on ‘planks’ two and three of unconcealment, the discovered world of meaningful things is, simultaneously, concealed when we involve ourselves in a task.
The work of art, on the other hand, is different in nature to the standard tool. The artwork, for Heidegger, is that which un-veils things and contextual realms whilst countering the tendency of being absorbed in a world. Through the work, we see things and their contextual worlds for the ‘first time’. In other words, art understood as aletheia exposes that which we would have otherwise been oblivious to.
Notwithstanding the controversies of Heidegger’s famous interpretation of van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes, the painting is that which reveals the ‘reliable’ meaning of the shoes, in light of a land-cultivating world, and the wearer whose role and place in such a world is unveiled as that of a ‘peasant woman’. Artworks, by this account, are instances of truth because they un-veil stages two and three of truth as un-concealment.
Where one would have otherwise been oblivious to the shoes and its world, the work of art discloses that which would have otherwise been taken for granted. As such, while Plato sees art as that which is furthest from the truth, a work of art, for Heidegger, not only is an instance of truth, but it is also an incarnation of truth.
If theatre harbours the potential to be needed by a city, then perhaps a needful theatre could be unlocked when seen as an incarnation of truth as aletheia.
A change from a Platonic conception of truth to a Heideggerian one is no ‘quick fix’, however. If the meaning of truth is something that could merely be chosen, then the sense of un-fickle durability that is implied in the meaning of truth, no matter how truth is conceived, is undermined. Moreover, if the standard for truth, whether as eidos or aletheia, is changed in order to ‘save’ the theatre industry, then a ‘correct’ conception of truth would be chosen for untruthful reasons. Such a manoeuvre prejudicially prioritises the preservation of theatre at all costs, without grounding it properly in terms of art and truth, and without asking why theatre should be saved in the first place.
As such, in the founding of a theatre company, one could either concede to the trending standards of a theatre industry, which only perpetuates its status as entertainment and a needless luxury. Or I could ask myself the following questions as I advance in the founding of SEERCRAFT.
1. Why should we accept the primacy of truth as unconcealment (aletheia) over truth as the Idea (eidos)?
2. How exactly does art, and by extension, theatre, matter more when conceived as an incarnation of truth?
3. Does the contemporary artist’s understanding of the nature of art and truth affect or even distort the productions they create?
4. Heidegger’s legacy as one of the greatest philosophers of all time is tarnished by the political ‘error’ that he committed in an ideological age. What is required of the modern theatre artist to prevent becoming a servant of ideology?
5. What is the paradigmatic understanding of art held by theatre artists themselves? Truth? Entertainment? Self-expression? Advocacy? Advertising? Activism? Changing the world? Propaganda? An idea?
6. Do the paradigmatic notions of theatre held by theatre artists and companies fulfil or betray the nature of art as truth?
7. If art is essentially an incarnation of a world, what role could theatre play in the modern city based on this understanding of truth and art?
These are the foundational questions that have animated the founding of SEERCRAFT.
SEERCRAFT’s inaugural production begins with Henrik Ibsen’s Rosmersholm showing this September 16 to October 10, 2026, in the heart of Brisbane, Australia. Tickets for the production are available now through the SEERCRAFT website: https://www.seercraft.com.au/
Silvan is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy writing a thesis on the nature of truth in art and theatre. Before starting his PhD, Silvan worked as a theatre actor, having performed with Queensland Theatre Company, Sydney Theatre Company, La Boite, and the Queensland Shakespeare Ensemble. He has been nominated 3 times for Best Supporting Actor and once for Best Sound Design/Composition for the Matilda Awards in theatre excellence. In September 2026, Silvan will be returning to the stage with SEERCRAFT Presents: Henrik Ibsen’s Rosmersholm, making his directorial debut with this production. Rosmersholm will be performed right in the heart of Brisbane, Australia, at the Albert Street Uniting Church, opposite King George Square.
IV
Texts referenced for this essay:
John Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice. Where Barish first coins the term that aptly describes philosophy’s antagonism towards theatre.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Widely regarded as Heidegger’s magnum opus and is the touchstone text for the phenomenology and existential traditions in philosophy.
Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ in Off the Beaten Track. Equally famous is Heidegger’s essay on art where he contends that art is itself an instance of truth.
Martin Heidegger’s Nietzsche I: The Will to Power as Art, contains a set of lectures on Plato’s concept of truth and the place that art occupies according to that standard.
Plato, The Republic. Need I say more? I use Allan Bloom’s translation.
Thomas Sheehan, Katherine Withy, and Mark A. Wrathall have all been useful scholars helping me decipher Heidegger’s complex understanding of truth.
Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger. Sheehan interprets Heidegger’s program of truth according to three levels but he names each stage in the reverse order.
Katherine Withy’s essay, ‘Concealing and Concealment’ makes the greatest advances on the concealment side of truth, and makes some important corrections to Wrathall’s contribution.
Mark A. Wrathall’s essay, ‘Unconcealment’, in A Companion to Heidegger, is one of the first which organises Heidegger’s concept of truth into stages or ‘planks’ of truth. Wrathall, however, offers four stages and not three. The fourth being that which makes the world stage of truth possible as the clearing or the Ereignis. Yet, Withy makes some important corrections granting that the third stage is made possible by another level, but that the fourth plank as the ‘Ereignis’ is something different to unconcealment.